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GUSTAFSON: ONE SMALL STEP (BACKWARD)
FOR PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS, ONE GIANT LEAP
(BACKWARD) FOR THE SECURITIES BAR
J. DORMER STEPHEN mH*
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a statute
or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then choose between
his version ofjustice and abiding by the American form of government.
Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to him obvious, is
compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is abstract,
rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To give in to
temptation, this one time, solves an urgent human problem, and a faint
crack appears in the American foundation. A judge has begun to rule
where a legislator should.'
Introduction
The United States government is a system "of laws and not of men."2 In
situations where the legislature has spoken through the enactment of a statute, the
judiciary is relegated to interpreting that law? However, as history has shown,
the judiciary does not always reserve the power to enact law to the legislature.4
* Associate in the corporate finance group of Hebb & Gitlin in Hartford, Connecticut. J.D., 1996,
Albany Law School of Union University; Editor-in-Chief, Albany Law Review. This article has benefitted
from the comments of Chester L. Fisher Ill, Gary S. Hammersmith and Professor James D. Redwood.
The author would like to thank Hebb & Gitlin for its promotion of legal scholarship. The opinions
expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Hebb
& Gitlin.
I. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1 (1990).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803); see also DONALD E. LIVELY, JUDICIAL
REvItw AND THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 75-76 (1990) (suggesting that courts are "attuned and
responsive ... to majoitarian preferences").
3. The Constitution of the United Sates of America grants "all legislative Powers" to Congress, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, while reserving "all judicial Powers" to the Supreme Court and all inferior courts
created by Congress, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. "Legislative Powers" has been construed to mean the
power to enact statutes and does not include the power to control their implementation or interpretation.
The Supreme Court has expressly construed the judiciary's power under article III as limited. "Judicial
power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for the purpose
of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." Osbum v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.).
4. See BORK, supra note 1, at 5 ("[J]udges must consider themselves bound by law that is
independent of their own views of the desirable. They must not make or apply any policy not fairly to
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The courts will occasionally take it upon themselves to render decisions that are
contrary to relevant statutory language or legislative intent, in order to reach what
they perceive as the correct result from a policy standpoint.5
This was recently exemplified in the Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson v.
Alloyd Co.6 when the Court interpreted the language of section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933' (Securities Act) as only applying to public offerings. The
Gustafson decision furthers the apparent trend to restrict the availability bf federal
securities law remedies for private plaintiffs! Unfortunately for private plaintiffs,
be found in the Constitution or a statute. It is of course true that judges to some extent must make law
every time they decide a case, but it is minor interstitial lawmaking."); GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON
LAW FOR THE AGE Or STATUTES 31-43 (posing the theory that judicial activism is a vehicle for
validating anachronistic laws); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30-32 (1949)
(discussing the occasioral abuse of power utilized by a court by imposing a different meaning upon the
statutory intention of Congress); see also LIVELY, supra note 2, at 49-70 (suggesting that judicial
activism is an inevitable fact of political reality since the text, legislative history, and structure of the law
are often equivocal or uncertain). See generally REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTES 1975) (advocating the need for developing an adequate theory on how to
read and apply statutes, thus minimizing the extent of judicial lawmaking); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting
Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
5. See Michael P. Kenny & Theresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory Construction to Cover the
Corporate Universe: TIe Misappropriation Theory of Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 141 (1995)
("The words of a statute must necessarily constrain courts when they engage in this process, otherwise,
they simply substitute arbitrary normative expressions of personal preference for any semblance of
legislative intent."); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962)
(stating that "judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy"); LIVELY, supra note
2, at 30-32; BORK, supra note 1, at 262 (opining that "law is being seduced by politics and is thereby
losing its integrity as a discipline. If it continues on this course, law will cease to be what Holmes named
it, calling for thinkers, and become merely the province of emoters and sensitives.") (citing Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Profe.,sion of the Law, in SPEECHES BY OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 22 (1st ed. 1913)):
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTrrUTIONAL CHOICES 30 (1985) (stating that "it seems axiomatic that the
words of a statute - and not the legislators' intent as such - must be the crucial elements both in the
statute's legal force and in its proper interpretation"); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent
in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. LL. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 63 (1988) (opining that the judicial
interpretation of statutes can often result in the creation of "laws" that could not have been passed by the
legislature"); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 809-10 (1983) (noting that disagreement during the legislative drafting process can
result in vague legislative intent).
6. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
7. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-38,48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1994)).
8. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered seztions of 15 U.S.C.) (providing for certain restrictions on private rights of action
under the federal securities laws); Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994)
(holding that private plnintiffs may not maintain an aiding and abetting action under rule lOb-5); Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,473-74 (1977) (holding that private plaintiffs must prove manipulation
and deception to maintain an action under rule lOb-5); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
(1976) (holding that private plaintiffs must prove scienter to maintain an action under rule lOb-5); see
also Douglas C. Buffoni, Predatory Attorneys and Professional Plaintiffs: Reforms Are Needed to Limit
Vexatious Securities Lidigation, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1995) (advocating the reform of vexatious
private lawsuits against American corporations); Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1994)
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss3/3
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section 12(2) is the latest provision in the federal securities laws to be scaled
back.
Section 12(2) of the Securities Act creates a cause of action or recision where
the offer or sale of a security through the means of a prospectus or oral
communication contains a materially false statement or an omission of a material
fact." A division among the circuit courts had developed concerning the
interpretation of "prospectus or oral communication" as it relates to section 12(2).
One line of case law, led by Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 0 held
that the scope of section 12(2) was limited to public offerings." The Ballay
court stated that the primary purpose of the Securities Act was to regulate public
offerings, not secondary market transactions. The second line of case law, led
by Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 3 extended the scope of section
12(2) beyond public offerings. 4 The Pacific Dunlop court stated that the term
"prospectus" should be defined via section 2(10), which includes a broad category
of communications rather than restricting liability solely to an offering prospec-
tus. 5 The Supreme Court recently resolved this dispute in Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., 6 by holding that section 12(2) liability only applies to public offerings. '
This landmark decision severely limits the scope of section 12(2). The decision
leaves section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193418 (Exchange Act)
and Rule lOb-5, 9 promulgated thereunder, as the only private remedies available
(urging the Securities and Exchange Commission to disimply private rights of action under the federal
securities laws); cf Joel Seligman, Comment, The Merits Do Matter, 108 HARV. L. REv. 438,439 (1994)
(arguing that there is "insufficient evidence to justify significant rule or legislative changes that would
further burden private federal securities legislation").
9. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
10. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
11. See id. at 693; see infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
12. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 693. Secondary market transfers are transactions that occur in the
marketplace of buyers and sellers of existing securities. See 3 THE NEw PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
MONEY & FINANCE'411 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992).
13. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
14. See id. at 582; see infra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
15. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582. "The term "prospectus" means any prospectus, notice,
circular, advertisement, letter or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security ... ." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(1O) (1994).
16. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
17. See id. at 1071.
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 7811 (1994)). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of any national
securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
19. Rule lob-5 states:
19961
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for misrepresentations made in connection with a private placement or secondary
market transaction. Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is not an attractive cause
of action for private plaintiffs because it requires the plaintiff to prove the
additional elementS of scienter," reliance,2 1 and causation.'
Although Gustafson reaches the correct result from a policy standpoint, the
analysis behind the result is flawed. The Court's misguided interpretation of the
statutory language could pose irreconcilable conflicts within the federal securities
laws that will have a lasting effect on practitioners.
This article begins with a discussion of the court decisions that have interpreted
the scope of section 12(2) up to Gustafson. Part H provides a critical examination
of the Gustafson analysis. Part HI discusses the effect and implications of the
Gustafson decision on the securities industry.
L The "Pre-Gustafson" Scope of Section 12(2)
The "roaring" 1920s, as far as the securities industry was concerned, came to
an abrupt halt when the stock market crashed on Black Monday, October 29,
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality cf interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
20. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-200 (1976). Justice Ginsburg noted in her
dissent in Gustafson that "§ 12(2) did not become prominent in Securities Act litigation until this court
held in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that an action for civil damages under
§ 10(b)... requires proof of scienter." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1083 n.8 (1995) (Ginsburg, I.,
dissenting); see also Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 101, 109
Stat. 737, 747 (requiring the plaintiff to state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind).
21. Reliance is reqaired in an action based on a material misrepresentation, rather than a material
omission. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972). The reliance
requirement can be satisfied in material misrepresentation situations by establishing a "fraud on the
market" theory. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-49 (1988) ("The fraud on the market
theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open market, the price of a company's stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and its businesses. . . . Misleading
statements will therefor. defraud purchases of stock even if the purchases do not directly rely on the
misstatements.... The causal connection between the defendants' fraud and the plaintiffs' purchase of
stock in such a case is no less significant than in a case of direct reliance on misrepresentations."
(quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
22. There are two strands contained in the causation requirement: transaction causation and loss
causation. Transaction causation requires the plaintiff to prove that the misrepresentation caused the
plaintiff to engage in the transaction. Loss causation requires the plaintiff to prove that the misrepresen-
tation or omission caused the plaintiff to suffer economic damages. See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement
Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that plaintiffs asserting an action based on an omission,
rather than a material misrepresentation, must only plead loss causation).
[Vol. 49:425
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1929. When the stock market crashed in 1929 it brought the "regulatory scheme"
of the securities industry crumbling down with it. President Franklin D. Roosevelt
began picking up the pieces after this devastating blow to the nation's economy
by staunchly advocating reform in the stock exchanges, the issuance of securities,
and securities trading.' Congress responded to President Roosevelt's initiatives
by enacting the Securities Act in order to restore stability to the nation's financial
markets. 4 The Securities Act has two basic objectives: to provide investors with
material information concerning the issuance of new securities to the public and
to prohibit the fraudulent sale of securities.' The Securities Act provides
investors with protection against noncompliance with these disclosure re-
quirements through the creation of private rights of action. 6 Section 12(2) of the
23. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933) (President's Message of March 23, 1933, to the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce). But see LoUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1-8 (3d ed. 1995) (arguing that the Securities Act did not grow out
of President Roosevelt's New Deal, but rather evolved from "a generation of state regulation and several
centuries of legislation in England').
24. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1994)). Congress continued to enact additional regulatory legislation for the securities
industry. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1994)); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333, 49
Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1994)); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub.
L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1994)); Investment
Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, §§ 1-53, 54 Stat. 789, 789-847 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1994)); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, §§ 201-222,
54 Stat. 789, 847-57 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1994)).
25. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS Er AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (7th ed. 1992). For a thorough
discussion on the purpose of the Securities Act and a "behind-the-scenes" look at the drafting of this
legislation, see James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 29 (1959).
26. The federal securities laws provide both express and implied private rights of action. The
Supreme Court has set forth eight express liability provisions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
See Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1993). These express provisions
are: Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994) (imposing liability for misstatements or
omissions in a registration statement); Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994) (imposing
liability for the sale of unregistered securities or fraud in the sale of securities); Securities Act of 1933
§ 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1994) (imposing liability on control persons); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1994) (imposing liability for manipulations of exchange traded securities);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1994) (imposing liability for "short-swing"
profits); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1994) (imposing liability for misleading
statements in reports filed with the Securities Exchange Commission); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994) (imposing liability on control persons); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1994) (imposing insider trader liability).
Courts have also created implied private rights of action under the federal securities laws. See Herman
& MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-87 (1983); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp.
512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying a private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994), and Rule lob-5, promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1994), which imposes liability for employing any device, scheme or artifice to defraud in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (implying
a private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994),
and Rule 14a-9, promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994), which imposes liability for fraud
1996]
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Securities Act is one of these protectionist remedies.27
Section 12(2) provides a remedy and recessionary damages to a purchaser of
a security against an offeror or seller of the security in the event that: (1) the
defendant offered or sold a security,, (2) through the means of interstate
commerce, (3) by the use of a prospectus or oral communication, (4) which
includes an untrue statement or omission of material fact; (5) the plaintiff did not
know of the untruth or omission, and (6) the defendant knew, or, in the exercise
of reasonable care, could have known of the untruth or omission. 8 Although this
may appear to be a straightforward provision in the federal securities laws, the
scope of section 12(2) has been the center of recent controversy. Courts29 and
in the connection with the solicitation of proxy statements); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 24-42
(1977) (implying a private cause of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1994), and Rule 14e-3, promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994), which imposes
liability for fraud in connection of tender offers).
27. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
28. See Monetary Management Group v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 615 F. Supp 1217, 1222 (E.D.
Mo. 1985); Gridley v. Sayre & Fisher Co., 409 F. Supp. 1266, 1272-73 (D.S.D. 1976), affd sub nom.
Gridley v. Cunningham, 550 F.2d 551 (8th Cir. 1977).
Section 12(2) states:
Any person who ... offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the provisions
of section 77c of this title [(Securities Act of 1933 § 3)], other than paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) of said section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation
or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or
oral communi~ation, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the circumstan-
ces under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such
untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon
the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Securities Act of 1933 §i 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
29. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Section 12(2): A Remedy for Wrongs in the Secondary
market?, 55 ALB. L. Rry. 97, 99 n.14 (1991) (listing cases that discuss the scope of section 12(2) to
secondary market transactions).
For cases holding t1fat section 12(2) applies to secondary market transactions, see Pacific Dunlop
Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993); Farley v. Baird, Patrick & Co., 750
F. Supp 1209, 1221 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Ramtek Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,483, at
97,521 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 1990); Elysian Fed. Say. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., 713 F. Supp
737, 747-51 (D.N.J. 1999); Scotch v. Mosely, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 709 F. Supp 95,
98 (N.D. Pa. 1988).
For cases holding that section 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions, see First Union
Discount Brokerage Seivs. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835, 843-44 (11th Cir. 1993); Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy,
983 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1992); Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272 (3d Cir, 1992); Ryder Int'l
Corp. v. First Am. Natl Bank, 943 F.2d 1521 (1lth Cir. 1991); Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker,
Inc., 925 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991); Bogart v. Shearson Lehman Bros., No. 91 CIV 1036, 1993 WL
33643, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1993); Fujisawa Pharm. Co. v. Kapoor, 814 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. III. 1993);
PPM America, Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 820 F. Supp. 970 (D. Md. 1993); Hedden v. Marinelli, 796 F. Supp
432 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Inz re Delmarva Sec. Litig., 794 F. Supp 1293 (D. Del. 1992); Budget Rent-A-Car
[Vol. 49:425
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scholars0 have attempted to define the scope of section 12(2) to determine
whether it applies to secondary market transactions.
In 1991, the Third Circuit, in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., held
that section 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions, reasoning that
the Securities Act was intended to regulate offerings of public securities.32
However, in May 1993, the Seventh Circuit threw its hat into the ring and
rejected the Third Circuit's holding in Ballay. In Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc.
v. Allen & Co.,33 the Seventh Circuit held that section 12(2) of the Securities Act
does apply to secondary market transactions.' This debate eventually prompted
the Supreme Court to resolve the issue in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co."5
Sys. v. Hirsch, 810 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 794 F. Supp.
1513, 1524-25 (D. Or. 1992); Bennet v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 785 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D.S.C. 1992); Bank
of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 763 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (D. Colo. 1991); Cox v. Eichler, 765
F. Supp. 601, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1990); T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund, Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F. Supp.
705, 709 (D. Md. 1990); Grinsell v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 744 F. Supp 931, 934 (N.D. Cal. 1990);
Leonard v. Stuart-James Co., 742 F. Supp 653, 658 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Mix v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 720 F.
Supp. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 1989); Panek v. Bogucz, 718 F. Supp. 1228, 1232-33 (D.N.J. 1989); Cheltenham
Bank v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 94,391, at 92,542 (E.D.N.C. Mar.
15, 1989); Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 4, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ralph v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc. 692 F. Supp. 1322, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1988); SSH Co. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp.
1055, 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
30. For articles by scholars arguing that section 12(2) applies to secondary market transactions see:
Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARv. L. REV. 908, 917 (1992); Louis
Loss, Securities Act Section 12(2): A Rebuttal, 48 Bus. LAw. 47 (1992); Therese H. Maynard, The
Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), 45 ALA. L. REv. 817, 822 (1994) [hereinafter Maynard, The
Future of Securities Act Section 12(2)]; Therese H. Maynard, Liability Under Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 847, 849 (1991); Robert N. Rapp, The Proper Role
of Securities Act Section 12(2) as an Aftermarket Remedy for Disclosure Violations, 47 Bus. LAW. 711,
714 (1992); Laura K. Bancroft, Note, Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: The Continued Shrinking of Private
Plaintiff Remedies Under the 1933 Securities Act, 27 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 149, 188 (1995); Adam D. Hirsh,
Note, Applying Section 12(2) of the 1933 Securities Act to the Aftermarket, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 955
(1990); Kevin N. Peter, Comment, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: Does It Apply to the
Secondary Market? The Circuits Are Fighting, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1205, 1239 (1994); Catherine Zucal,
Comment, Does Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 Apply To Secondary Trading?: Ballay v.
Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1179, 1183 (1991).
For articles by scholars arguing that section 12(2) does not apply to secondary market transactions
see: Prentice, supra note 29, at 140; Elliott J. Weiss, The Courts Have It Right: Securities Act Section
12(2) Applies Only to Public Offerings, 48 Bus. LAW. 1, 4 (1992).
31. 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
32. See id. at 693. In First Union Discount Brokerage Services v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11 th Cir.
1993), the Eleventh Circuit joined the Third Circuit's position.
33. 993 F.2d 578, 595 (7th Cir. 1993).
34. See id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Pacific Dunlop Holdings in February 1994.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, the parties agreed to a voluntary settlement and
the case was dismissed. See Allen & Co. v. Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc., 510 U.S. 1160 (1994).
35. 115 S. Ct. 32 (1994). Subsequent to the dismissal of Pacific Dunlop Holdings, the Supreme
Court, apparently anxious to define the scope of section 12(2), granted certiorari in Gustafson.
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A. Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.
The Third Circuit was the first federal circuit court to determine the scope of
section 12(2)."6 In Ballay, forty-one investors asserted causes of action under
section 10(b) and ;ection 12(2) of the Securities Act against the brokerage house
of Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. (Legg Mason)." The investors alleged that
Legg Mason had made oral misrepresentations regarding the book value of
Wickes Company securities (Wickes).38
The district court jury denied the investors' section 10(b) claim but found in
favor of the investors on their section 12(2) claim. 9 Legg Mason moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, asserting that section 12(2) should not be
applied to secondary market transactions.4' The district court denied the motion
and held that section 12(2) applied to aftermarket trading, stating that the plain
language of secticn 12(2) does not limit its application to public offerings of
securities and that the broad remedial purposes of the Securities Act are not
restricted to public: distributions.4 '
The Third Circuit reversed the district court and held that section 12(2) did not
apply to'secondary market transactions.42 The court first examined the precise
language of the statute.43 In particular, the court focused on the meaning of "oral
communication" in the section 2(10) definition of "prospectus."" The court
utilized the canon of construction principle noscitur a sociis and determined that
the phrase "oral communication" was limited by its meaning to the more
restrictive term "prospectus." 45 After the statutory language analysis, the court
36. See Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991).
37. See id. at 684, 686.
38. See id. at 684. According to a Legg Mason branch manager, "Legg Mason is a full service
brokerage house which subscribes to a value philosophy of investing." Id. at 685 (footnote omitted).
Operating under this invstment philosophy, Legg Mason promoted undervalued stock of companies with
growth potential, such a, those recently emerging from bankruptcy or reorganization (i.e., Wickes). See
id. Legg Mason used various factors in calculating the value of these companies, one of which was
goodwill, an intangible asset. See id. The investors argued that in calculating book value of the company,
goodwill should not have been included since intangible assets cannot be readily sold in the event of a
liquidation, and therefore, should not be included for "purposes of estimating the downside risk." Id.
39. See id. at 686.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 686-7.
42. See id. at 693.
43. See id. at 687 (stating that statutory construction begins with the language of the statute); see
also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
44. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688. For a definition of "prospectus" under section 2(10), see supra note
15.
45. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 688 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)
by stating that "[tlhe maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not
an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid
the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress"). The Ballay court noted that "[tjhe fact that
'oral communication' keeps company with 'prospectus' suggests... that the more general term [oral
communication] be limited to conform to the more restrictive term [prospectus] where consonant with
the legislative intent." I.
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determined that the word "prospectus" is a term of art which describes the
transmittal of information with regard to a public offering.
46
The court then examined the legislative history and structure of the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. The court noted that Congress sought to regulate
public offerings with the Securities Act, while the Exchange Act was established
to regulate unfair practices on securities exchanges.47 The logical result of this
presumption is that since section 12(2) is part of the Securities Act, it therefore
relates solely to public offerings, unless the legislative history states otherwise,
which in this case the court stated that it did not.
48
The court concluded its analysis with a comparison of section 12(2) with
section 17(a) of the Securities Act49 and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,"
both of which apply to secondary market transactions. The court distinguished
section 17(a) for various reasons. Unlike section 17(a), the legislative history of
section 12(2) is "devoid" of any indication that Congress intended it to be broader
than the limited scope of sections 11 and 12(1)."I Furthermore, section 17(a)
does not contain the phrase "prospectus or oral communication" but instead
provides as unlawful conduct employed "directly or indirectly ... to obtain
money or property by means of any untrue statement .... ."" The court
construed this distinction in language to mean that Congress intended the reach
of section 17(a) to be much broader than section 12(2)."3 The court also
differentiated section 10(b) of the Exchange Act from section 12(2). The court
46. See id. The Third Circuit displayed typical judicial activism in its apparent attempt to restrict
the scope of section 12(2) to public offerings, thus eliminating one more weapon from the private
plaintiff arsenal. The court feared that a broad reading of"oral communication" would inherently provide
purchasers with a cause of action under section 12(2) for negligent, misrepresentations even though the
purchaser could not recover under section 10(b) because of the scienter, causation and reliance
requirements. See icL at 689. The court further noted that under its analysis, although flawed,
"[i]nterpreting section 12(2) so that 'oral communication' refers to both initial and secondary trading...
would create an anomaly in that sellers in the aftermarket would be liable only for oral and not written
misrepresentations because the term 'prospectus' is limited to initial offerings." Idl
47. See id. at 690.
48. See id The court made a further leap of faith when it noted that the location of section 12(2)
in the Securities Act, behind sections I 1 and 12(1), which relate to public offerings, and before section
13, which relates to public offerings, indicates that section 12(2) is similarly restricted to public offerings.
See id. at 691.
49. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994). Section 17(a) and section 12(2) have
been referred to as criminal analogues because of their similar language. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 691.
The Supreme Court has held section 17(a) applicable to secondary market transactions. See United Sates
v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
50. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). The Supreme Court has
held that purchasers of securities can bring private causes of action in secondary market transactions. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195-97 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
51. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692 ("Had Congress intended section 12(2) to extend to liability for
secondary transactions, it could have preceded 'oral communication' with 'any' and explicitly stated its
special intent in the legislative history.").
52. Ba~lay, 925 F.2d at 691 (quoting Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994)).
53. See id. at 691-92.
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focused on the fact that the elements of proof required and damages recoverable
between the provisions differed substantially.'
The Third Circuit thus set the stage for restricting the scope of section 12(2)
to public securities distributions. Shortly thereafter, the Seventh Circuit appeared
on the scene in Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co." and departed from
the prevailing view established in Ballay.
B. Pacific Dunlop Holdings Inc. v. Allen & Co.
The Seventh Circuit was presented with the task of determining the scope of
section 12(2) approximately two years after the Third Circuit decided Ballay.
Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. (Pacific Dunlop) entered into a stock purchase
agreement with GNB Holdings, Inc. (GNB).'6 The stock purchase agreement
warranted that GN]3 and its subsidiaries were in compliance with all the appli-
cable environmental rules and regulations, were not subject to any pending
governmental investigation, and fully disclosed all liabilities and obligations."
Subsequent to the stock purchase agreepient, Pacific Dunlop discovered that GNB
was exposed to extensive environmental claims, liabilities regarding a government
services contract, and occupational disease claims." Upon this discovery, Pacific
Dunlop instituted a lawsuit against GNB alleging that GNB had omitted material
facts that rendered its representations in the stock purchase agreement false and
misleading, constituting a violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act."
The district court, relying on the Ballay decision, dismissed the action stating
that the stock purchase agreement was not a public offering of stock.' The
Seventh Circuit, on appeal, examined the relevant statutory language and
legislative history surrounding section 12(2), compared section 12(2) to similar
fraud provisions, and concluded that section 12(2) "applies to any communication
which offers any sezurity for sale or confirms the sale of any security, including
the stock purchase agreement in the present case.""
The Seventh Circuit did agree with the Third Circuit on one issue (albeit
trivial): "The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
54. See id. at 692. Section 12(2) provides recisionary dariages, while section 10(b) only permits
recovery of actual damages. See id. at 693. Compare Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988) with Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Section 12(2), unlike section 10(b), does not contain
the requirements of scienter, reliance, or causation. "If it were determined that section 12(2) applies to
secondary market trading, the more lenient requirements of section 12(2) would effectively eliminate the
use of section 10(b) by socurities purchasers." Ballay, 925 F.2d at 692.
55. 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
56. See id. at 579. The defendants in this case were two principal shareholders of GNB: Allen &
Co., Inc., an investment brnking firm, which owned 20% of the stock, and Daniel Heffeman, who owned




60. See Pacific Dunbp Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., No. 90-C-5678, 1991 WL 348493, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 16, 1991), rev'd, 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1993).
61. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 595.
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language itself."' 2 In examining the language of section 12(2), the court initially
focused on whether the terms "prospectus or oral communication" were intended
to apply to secondary market transactions.' The court noted the historically
broad scope of the section 2(10) definition of "prospectus" and concluded that a
contract of sale or any written communication that disposes of a security, such as
the stock purchase agreement at hand, is included within that scope.'
Although the Securities Act contains only one definitional provision of
prospectus, it describes more than one type of prospectus in various provisions.
For example, section 1065 prescribes additional requirements for a section 2(10)
prospectus for purposes of complying with section 5(b)(1).' The court wrestled
with the issue of which prospectus definition to apply for under section 12(2).
The Seventh Circuit adopted a broad section 2(10) definition of prospectus to
include communications used to solicit investor interest in both the initial
distribution and secondary trading markets.67 The court determined that section
2(10) is the controlling definitional provision "unless the context otherwise
requires."'  The Seventh Circuit, after examining the structure of the Securities
Act and the text of section 12, concluded that section 12(2) applies to secondary
market transactions. 9 The court then proceeded to analyze the legislative history
of section 12(2).7o
62. Id. at 582 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975)); see
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
63. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 582-83.
64. See id. at 583 (citing Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1309 (2d Cir.
1977) (quoting Securities Act Release No. 2623 (1941), reprinted in 11 Fed. Reg. 10,964 (1946)
("'[P]rospectus' include[s] 'within its meaning an ordinary confirmation,' as well as 'every kind of written
communication... which constitutes a contract of sale or disposition of a security for value.'")).
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1993 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
66. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(1) (1994). Section 5(b)(1) prohibits the use
of any instrument or communication relating to the sale of a security unless the form of the prospectus
meets the requirements set forth in section 10. The distribution of preliminary prospectus is authorized
pursuant to section 10(b) after the registration statement has been filed. See id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j(b) (1994). The use of statutory prospectus is authorized pursuant to section 10(a) after the
registration statement has become effective. See id. § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a) (1994) (after the
registration statement becomes effective, a preliminary prospectus may be used for informational
purposes pursuant to Securities Act of 1933 Rule 431).
67. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 588; see also Diskin v. Lomasney & Co., 452 F.2d 871, 874
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding that a letter that accompanied an offering circular sent to prospective purchasers
constituted a prospectus).
68. Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 584 (emphasis omitted). For a discussion of this "context clause,"
see Maynard, The Future of Securities Act Section 12(2), supra note 30, at 840 n.103.
69. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 595. The court, in dicta, agreed with the Third Circuit by
restricting the term "oral communication" to those oral communications that relate to a prospectus. See
id. at 588 ("The words 'oral communication' are words of form, not substance; they describe how one
communicates a message, not the message content.").
70. The court noted that it could have concluded its opinion after examining the statutory language.
See id. at 589. The court continued its analysis to rebut the Third Circuit's legislative history analysis.
See id. at 589 n.16 ("[I]f the language of a provision of the securities laws is sufficiently clear in its
context and not at odds with the legislative history, it is unnecessary to examine the additional
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The House Report of the Securities Act focused primarily on offerings that
required a registration statement." The Senate Report of the Securities Act,
which was apparently adopted by the Conference Report, focused on the recovery
for any fraudulent sale of a security.' The court held that there is nothing
contained in the legislative history to suggest a more narrow definition of
prospectus than that established by the statutory language of section 2(10)."
Finally, the court dispensed with the notion that section 12(2) should be
confined to public offerings in light of the other liability provisions established
by the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.74 The Seventh Circuit thus held that
the scope of section 12(2) extends beyond the public offering and includes
secondary market transactions.
The Pacific Dunlop decision created a division among the federal circuit courts
concerning the scope of section 12(2). On one hand, the Ballay line of cases held
that section 12(2) was restricted to public offerings.' On the other hand, the
Pacific Dunlop line of cases held that section 12(2) applies to both initial
offerings and secondary market transactions.'6 This conflict was promptly
addressed by the Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.' Although the
Supreme Court addressed the conflict surrounding section 12(2), the decision
itself may have created a more serious problem for the court system in the future
when it is called upon to interpret the statutory language of the federal securities
laws.
1. The Gustafson Debacle
A. The Facts
In 1989, the three sole shareholders of Alloyd Co. (Sellers) agreed to sell their
stock to Wind Point Brothers II, L.P. (Wind Point). Wind Point relied
extensively on a business review of Alloyd Co. conducted by KPMG Peat
considerations of policy that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.")
(quoting Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980)). The Supreme Court has also noted that the
legislative history behind section 12(2) is "sparse." See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 657
(1986).
71. See Pacific Dunlop, 993 F.2d at 589-90 (citing H.R. REP. No. 73-85 (1933)).
72. See id. at 590-92.
73. See it at 592.
74. See id. at 592-95. The court compared section 12(2) with section 17(a) of the Securities Act and
section 10(b) of the E:change Act, both of which apply to secondary market transactions. The defendant
argued, "that because Congress had intended the scope of section 17 to include initial and secondary
sales, by not using the identical words 'directly or indirectly' in both sections, Congress intended to
confine section 12(2) to initial offerings." Id. at 593. The court responded to this argument by stating
that "Congress. .. can write the statute as Congress desires." Id. The defendant also fashioned a similar
argument with regard to section 10(b). The court responded by stating that nothing in section 10(b)
requires a different interpretation of section 12(2). See id.
75. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 55-74 and accompanying text.
77. 115 S. Ct. 1061 (1995).
78. See id. at 1064.
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Marwick in arriving at its decision to purchase the company." The business
review included an estimated inventory figure because it was the company's
policy to determine inventory levels at the end of the year.'
Wind Point purchased all of the Alloyd stock from the Sellers through an
acquisition agreement8' which stipulated that the purchase price would be
adjusted to reflect any variance between the projected estimated figures in
Alloyd's financial statements and the actual year-end results.' The year-end
audit revealed that Alloyd's actual earnings for 1989 were lower than the
projected estimates relied upon by the parties in arriving at the purchase price."
The Sellers remitted the shortfall to Wind Point in accordance with the private
offering agreement.'
Alloyd Co. (the newly formed company) and Wind Point, nevertheless, brought
a lawsuit against the Sellers seeking to rescind the acquisition agreement under
section 12(2) of the Securities Act alleging that the statements made by the
Sellers regarding Alloyd's financial data were inaccurate, rendering the represen-
tations and warranties contained in the agreement untrue." They further alleged
that the acquisition agreement was a "prospectus," thus rendering any
misstatements contained therein a violation of section 12(2).86
The district court, relying on the Ballay decision, granted the Sellers' motion
for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the transaction at issue was
privately negotiated and therefore did not constitute a violation of section 12(2),
which the court held was only applicable to public offerings." The Seventh
Circuit, on appeal, vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of its decision in Pacific Dunlop." The Supreme
Court, apparently anxious to define the scope of section 12(2), granted certiorari.
B. The Supreme Court Opinions
1. The Majority
The majority framed the issue at hand as whether the sale agreement between
Alloyd and Gustafson was a prospectus as the term is used in the Securities
Act.8 The Court examined section 2(10), which sets forth the definition of a
prospectus; section 10, which sets forth the information required to be included
79. See iU at 1064-65.









89. See id. at 1066. Alloyd argued that "prospectus" should be defined broadly, thus encompassing
the agreement between the parties. See id. Gustafson, however, argued that "prospectus" is restricted to
communications relating to public offerings. See id.
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in a prospectus; and section 12, which imposes liability for material misstatements
or omissions contained in a prospectus."
The logical starting point for interpreting the meaning of "prospectus" would
have been the definitional provision found in section 2(10). However, the Court,
rather curiously, began its analysis with section 10, which is a clear initial
indication that the majority does not understand the structure of the federal
securities laws.
Section 10 requires that certain prospectuses contain the information contained
in a registration statement.9 Although the Court observed that section 10 does
not define a prospectus, it noted that section 10 instructs when a document cannot
be classified as a prospectusY Applying this reasoning to the facts of this case,
the Court stated that the private offering agreement could not be considered a
prospectus under section 10 because it did not contain all of the information
required to be contained in a prospectus forming part of a registration
statement. The Court then concluded that if the private offering agreement was
not a prospectus under section 10, it was not a prospectus under section 12(2)Y
The Court moved to an examination of section 12(2). It began by noting that
section 12(2) exempts from its coverage any prospectus used in connection with
an offering exempt under section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act.' The Court
reasoned that if Congress had wanted to establish liability under section 12(2) for
all misstatements contained in written communications, it would not have created
an exception for government-issued securities.96 The Court concluded that "[t]he
90. See id. at 1066-74.
91. See id. at 1066. Section 10 provides in part:
(1) a prospectus relating to a security other than a security issued by a foreign
government or political subdivision thereof, shall contain the information contained in the
registration statement...
(2) a prospectus relating to a security issued by a foreign government or political
subdivision thereof shall contain the information contained in the registration state-
ment ....
Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994) (emphasis added).
92. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066-67.
93. See id. at 1067.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1067-68. Section 3(a)(2) is a transaction-based exemption from the registration
requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act, which applies to securities issued or guaranteed by the
United States, a state, a municipality, a government instrumentality, national banks or state banks. See
Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994).
96. See id. at 1068. The Court further noted that the government issued securities exception is
logical since it provides a precise and appropriate means of giving immunity to government authorities.
See id. The dissent, however, refuted this argument. It offered two plausible suggestions for the
exemption of government securities under section 12(2): (1) Congress thought it was unnecessary to
impose liability on the secondary sellers of a government security since there is readily available
information regarding the securities from the markets or the government entities; or (2) Congress chose
not to burden government securities with the costs that would accrue from additional liabilities on
secondary market transactions. See id. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
This restrictive language can be interpreted as a clear indication that Congress intended to limit the
exceptions to section 12(2)'s coverage. If Congress intended to restrict section 12(2) to public offerings,
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anomaly disappears, however, when the term 'prospectus' relates only to
documents that offer securities sold to the public by an issuer."'
The Court then attempted a cursory review of the purpose behind the Securities
Act, which, according to the Court, was the creation of registration and disclosure
obligations for public offerings." The Court stated that the Securities Act is
limited to providing remedies for violations of registration and disclosure
obligations in public offerings." The Court believed that section 12(2), like the
other obligations created by the Securities Act, was linked to public offerings."
It then rejected Alloyd's argument that any written offer is a prospectus for
purposes of section 12(2), stating that this would incorrectly result in the term
"prospectus" having a broader scope than the same term in section 10."~
The Court concluded its analysis where it should have started, the definitional
provision of section 2(10). Section 2(10) defines prospectus as: "any prospectus,
notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication, written or by radio or
television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale of any securi-
ty .. . ." Alloyd argued that any written communication that offers a security
for sale is a prospetus.0 3 The Court, however, quickly dispensed with this
argument by manipulating two rules of statutory construction. First, the Court
refused to read section 2(10) as rendering some of the words contained therein as
redundant) 4 The Court added that if the term "communication" included every
written communication, it would render "notice, circular, advertisement, [and]
letter" redundant because each of those terms is also a form of com-
munication."°4
The second canon of construction utilized by the Court was the doctrine
noscitur a sociis, which holds that no one term should be interpreted so broadly
as to render its accompanying words inconsistent."4 The Court used these two
rules of construction to hold that a communication will qualify as a prospectus
under section 2(10) if it is a document of wide dissemination and a public
communication."
it certainly could have carved out the section 4(2) exemption, among other private offering exemptions
to registration. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.




101. See id. The Court would not "accept the conclusion that this single operative word means one
thing in one section of the Act and something quite different in another." Id.
102. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1O) (1994).
103. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1069.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. This doctrine avoids "ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent
with its accompanying words, thus giving 'unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress."' Id. (quoting
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)). The Court had used this doctrine in the past
in its interpretation of "security" under the Exchange Act. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56,
63 (1990).
107. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1070.
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The Court garnered further support for its erratic decision through its analogy
to section 17(a) of the Securities Act' and its decision in United States v.
Naftalin.' The Court in Naftalin held that section 17(a) prescribed liability for
both public distributions and ordinary market transactions.' The Gustafson
Court distinguished section 17(a) from section 12(2) by stating that section 17(a)
did not contain the limiting language "by means of prospectus or oral com-
munication" and its legislative history clearly indicated it was not intended to be
restricted to public offerings."'
The Court concluded that a "prospectus" in section 12(2) is a term that
describes a communication that contains all of the required information in section
10 of the Securities Act."' Since the private offering agreement at issue did not
contain all of the required information under section 10 of the Securities Act (i.e.,
was not a public offering), Alloyd could not rescind the agreement under section
12(2).' 1
2. The Dissent
A dissenting opinion, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Scalia,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, states the proposition that section 12(2) applies to
secondary transactions as well as public offerings."' The dissent, unlike the
majority, properly maneuvered through the various sections of the Securities Act
The list of terms in § 2(10) prevents a seller of stock from avoiding liability by calling
a soliciting document something other than a prospectus .... [The term "written
communication" must be read in context to refer to writings that, from a functional
standpoint, are similar to the terms "notice, circular, [and] advertisement." The term
includes communications held out to the public at large but that might have been thought
to be outside the other words in the definitional section.
Id.
,108. Section 17(a) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by the
use of the mails, directly or indirectly ... (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, or (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994).
109. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
110. See hi. at 778.
111. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1071.
112. See id. at 1073-74.
113. See id at 1074.
114. See id. (Thoma3, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, offered a second
dissenting opinion quite similar to Justice Thomas' dissent. Justice Ginsburg, like Justice Thomas,
focused on the broad language of section 2(10) and criticized the majority for its result-oriented decision-
making process. See id. at 1079-83 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg further added an
examination of the legislative history of the Securities Act as well as scholarly commentary on the issue.
See id. at 1081-83.
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in arriving at this conclusion. It started its analysis with an examination of the
section at issue, section 12(2), and then proceeded to examine section 2(10), the
relevant definitional provision, and concluded with an examination of the overall
structure of the Securities Act.
The dissent criticized the majority's means of defining "prospectus" under the
Securities Act,"5 specifically attacking the majority's use of sources outside the
four corners of the statute to interpret the term "prospectus.""6 The dissent
thought it was unnecessary to look further than section 2(10) to find its definition
of prospectus for section 12(2)."' In so doing, it criticized the majority's misap-
plication of the doctrine noscitur a sociis." The dissent correctly noted that
"[n]oscitur a sociis is a well established rule of construction where words are of
obscure or doubtful meaning; and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to
remove the obscurity or doubt by reference to the associated words."""
However, since the meaning of "prospectus" is neither doubtful nor obscure, there
is no reason to apply this statutory canon. Justice Thomas argued that the broad
language of section 2(10) required a broad interpretation of the term "prospe-
ctus."'" In doing so, he rejected the majority's assertion that a broad definition
of prospectus renders much of the section 2(10) language redundant."'
The dissent then moved to. an examination of the use of the term "prospectus"
in other provisions of the Securities Act. The dissent agreed with the majority's
observation that other sections of the Securities Act employ a narrower interpreta-
tion of "prospectus."' " It did not agree, however, that Congress intended the
115. See id. at 1074-75 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("We should use section 2(10) to define'prospectus'
for the 1933'Act, rather than, as the majority does, use the 1933 Act to define 'prospectus' for section
2(10).").
116. See id. at 1074 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. The dissent believed that the majority sought to avoid an obvious clear meaning of prospectus
under section 2(10) by introducing the maxim noscitur a sociis to create ambiguity. See id. at 1075
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514,
519 (1923)). The dissent also argued that the majority's application of the doctrine was improper because
it does not necessarily require the court to construe every term in a series narrowly because of the
meaning given to one term. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Section 2(10)'s very exhaustiveness suggests that 'prospectus'
is merely the first item in a long list of covered documents, rather than a brooding omnipresence whose
meaning cabins that of all the following words."). Justice Thomas further noted that Congress' use of
the phrase "communication, written or by radio or television" was intended to catch anything that had
been omitted in the definition. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 1075-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the majority that §§ 5 and 10 cannot
embrace fully the broad definition of prospectus supplied by § 2(10) and used by § 12(2)."); see also
Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a)(3) (1994) (specifying information required in a
prospectus); Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994) (requiring a prospectus to accompany
the sale of a security).
1996]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1996
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
term "prospectus" to be interpreted consistently throughout the Act."' In support
of this argument, the dissent noted that the phrase "confirms the sale of any
security" contained in the definition of prospectus in section 2(10) is not
contained in section 10.' It found further support in the introductory language
of section 2, the definitional provision of the Securities Act, which states that the
definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires."' The dissent believed
that since there is no context requiring otherwise in section 12(2), Congress
intended the default meaning of "prospectus" to apply."
The dissent then maintained, contrary to the majority opinion, that section 12(2)
does not contain distinctions between public offerings and aftermarket trading
activity." "If... Congress had intended to limit § 12(2) to initial public offer-
ings, it presumably would have used words such as 'issuer,' 'public offering,' or
'private,' or 'resale,' or at least discussed trading on the exchanges or the liability
of dealers, underwriters, and issuers."" It further contended that the absence of
a reference in section 12(2) to a transaction exemption under section 4 sup-
plements the argurent that Congress did not intend to restrict section 12(2) to
public offerings.'
123. The dissent used a clever analogy to a hypothetical statute to clarify its position:
Suppose that the Act regulates cars, and that § 2(10) of the Act defines a "car" as any car,
motorcycle, truck, or trailer. Section 10 of this hypothetical statute then declares that a
car shall have seatbelts, and § 5 states that it is unlawful to sell cars without seatbelts.
Section 12(2) of this Act then creates a cause of action for misrepresentations that occur
during the sale of a car. It is reasonable to conclude that §§ 5 and 10 apply only to what
we ordinarily refer to as !'cars," because it would be absurd to require motorcycles and
trailers to have seatbelts. But the majority's reasoning would lead to the further conclusion
that § 12(2) does not cover sales of motorcycles, when it is clear that the Act includes
such sales.
Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. See id. (Thomis, J., dissenting).
125. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[N]othing in § 12(2) indicates that the 'context otherwise
requires' the use of a definition of 'prospectus' other than the one provided by § 2(10).... [l]t is § 10's
'context' that seems to require the use of a definition which is different from that of § 2(10).").
126. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Congress has expressly provided otherwise in other sections
of the Securities Act, tfus indicating it would have stated otherwise in section 12(2) if that was its
intention. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. 77e(b)(1) (1994) (referring to any prospectus
relating to a security for which a registration statement has been filed unless the prospectus meets the
requirements of section 10); Securities Act of 1933 § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. 77j(a) (1994) (referring to a
prospectus that is required to contain the information of a registration statement); Securities Act of 1933
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 77j(b) (1994) (referring to a prospectus that is filed as part of a registration statement).
127. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1076.
128. Id. at 1076-77; see, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994) (exempting
"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"); Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77k 1994) (creating liability for false or misleading registration statements for "every person who was
a director of... or partr er in the issuer"); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164,
177 (1994) (eliminating liability for aiding and abetting under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
reasoning: "If... Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we presume it would have
used the words 'aid' and 'abet' in the statutory text. But it did not.").
129. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Section 4 of the Securities Act
exempts transactions from the registration requirements of section 5. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4, 15
[Vol. 49:425
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol49/iss3/3
GUSTAFSON: A STEP BACKWARD
The dissent then refuted the majority's misapplication of section 17(a) of the
Securities Act, and the Court's analysis in United States v. Naftalin"3 ' thereunder,
to section 12(2)."' First, the dissent rejected the contention that the structure of
the Securities Act restricted the application of section 17 to public offerings.'32
Second, the dissent reiterated that the Exchange Act's applicability to fraud in the
secondary market does not lead to the conclusion that the Securities Act applies
only to public offerings.' "Naftalin counsels the Court to reject arguments that
we should read § 12(2) narrowly in order to avoid redundancy in securities
regulation."'"
Finally, the dissent examined the driving public policy motivations behind the
majority's decision. 3 ' The dissent noted that the majority based its decision on
the assumption that Congress did not intend to impose liability on sellers in the
secondary market." Although the dissent could relate to the majority's concern
of increased securities litigation if section 12(2) was extended to secondary
market transactions, it correctly noted that it was the duty of the legislature, not
the Court, to rectify the situation.3 The dissent concluded that "[i]f the majority
believes that § 12(2)'s requirements are too burdensome for the securities markets,
it must rely' upon the other branches of government to limit the 1933 Act."'3
C. Supplemental Arguments in Dissent Not Addressed by the Supreme Court
Opinion
1. The Origin of Section 2(10) Manifests a Broad Interpretation of "Pro-
spectus"
The foundation of section 2(10) indicates that the legislature intended the term
"prospectus" to reach beyond public offering transactions. The English Companies
Act has been noted as the paramount source of the Securities Act.'39 The
U.S.C. § 77d (1994). "If Congress had intended § 12(2) to govern only initial public offerings, it would
have been simple for Congress to have referred to the § 4 exemptions in § 12(2)." Gustafson, 115 S. Ct.
at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
131. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1077-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132. See id. at 1077 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. See id. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The fact that there may well be some overlap is
neither unusual nor unfortunate.") (quoting SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 468 (1969)).
134. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Naftalin, 441 U.S. at 778).
135. See id. at 1078-79 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. See id. at 1078 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is for Congress, and not for this Court, to
determine the desired level of securities liability"); see also Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511
U.S. 164, 188 (1994) (stating that public policy considerations "cannot override our interpretation of the
text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence to the text
and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it") (citing
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
138. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
139. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 123 (1953) (stating that the British Companies
Act was one of the "statutory antecedents" of'the federal securities laws); see also Landis, supra note
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English Companies Act defined "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular,
advertisement, or other invitation, offering to the public for subscription or
purchase any shares or debentures of a company."'" The designers of the
Securities Act closely paralleled the English Companies Act in arriving at the
definition of prospactus under section 2(10)."' The Securities Act, however, did
not include language limiting the scope of a prospectus to an "offering to the
public."'" This would strongly imply that the drafters intended that the term
"prospectus" would apply to transactions beyond the ambit of public offerings by
virtue of the excluded reference to an "offering to the public."""
2. The Structure and Context of the Securities Act
The structure and context of the Securities Act as a whole does not provide a
basis for limiting section 12(2) to public offerings. Although a central objective
of the Securities Act is to regulate public offerings, the Supreme Court has noted
that it has additional functions." Section 12(2), like section 17(a), prohibits
misstatements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, and the
Supreme Court's observation concerning section 17(a)45 is equally applicable to
section 12(2): there is no distinction between public and private distributions.
The location of section 12(2) in the Securities Act is not indicative of an
intention to limit section 12(2) to public offerings. Although section 12(2) is
located after sections 11 and 12(1) and before section 13, all which relate to
public offerings, their proximity to section 12(2) is unrelated to the subject of
public offerings."T Section 11 was placed adjacent to section 12 because those
provisions contain the Securities Act's only private rights of action." 7 A valid
argument can be feshioned that section 12(1) was placed in the same provision
25, at 34.
140. Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 380(1) (1929) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
141. For a definition of "prospectus" under section 2(10), see supra note 15.
142. See supra note 15.
143. In an initial draft of the House Bill, the remedy for false or misleading representations in a
prospectus was contained in section 11 and was limited to prospectuses filed with a registration
statement. An ensuing draft removed the restriction concerning public offerings and transferred the
provision from section II to section 12. See HR. CONF. REP. No. 73-152, at 24 (1933); see also Landis,
supra note 25, at 30-49.
144. See United Stares v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979). In Naftalin, the Court rejected the
argument that section 17(a) of the Securities Act is only applicable to public offerings. See id.; see also
supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (defining section 17(a) and comparing it section 12(2)).
145. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1070-71 (1995).
146. Section 11 imposes liability for false or misleading statements contained in a registration
statement. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994). Section 12(1) imposes liability for
sales of securities in violation the registration requirements of section 5. See Securities Act of 1933
§ 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1994). Section 13 provides the statute of limitations for private rights of
action under sections 11 and 12. See Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994). The court
in Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), considered the location of
section 12(2) in the Securities Act relevant in holding section 12(2) solely applicable to public offerings.
See supra note 48.
147. For a discussioan of private rights of action under the federal securities laws, see supra note 26.
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as section 12(2) because both create private rights of action against the seller and
provide the same ameliorative measures (rescission or, if the security has been
sold, damages)."4 The obvious reason for the placement of section 13 is that it
provides the statute of limitations for the preceding two provisions, sections 11
and 12."1 There is, therefore, no merit to the argument that the location of
section 12(2) lends further credence to the argument that it should be restricted
to public offerings.
3. Policy Arguments in Support of a Broad Application of Section 12(2)
Although the policies of the federal securities laws are not formally permitted
to transcend the language of the particular statute," the overriding policy
considerations favor the application of section 12(2) beyond public offerings.
Congress enacted the federal securities laws to provide investors with material
information concerning the issuance of new securities and to prohibit the
fraudulent sales of securities.' Section 12(2) accomplishes this objective by
providing purchasers of securities with a private cause of action for misstatements
in the sale of securities." The notion that Congress would not provide a
protectionist remedy for false or misleading statements in connection with a
private sale of securities is contrary to the legislative purpose that provoked the
legislature to create the federal securities laws."
I1. The Effect of Gustafson's Misguided Statutory Interpretation
Gustafson held that the term "prospectus" refers to a document that relates to
a public offering by an issuer or its controlling shareholders and contains the
information required to be included in a registration statement." It further held
that a document does not cease to be a prospectus if it omits a required piece of
information.' Furthermore, "a document is not a prospectus ... if, absent an
exemption, it need not comply with § 10's requirements."" This appears to
limit the scope of section 12(2) to transactions registered, or required to be
148. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. 771 (1994).
149. See supra note 146.
150. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994); Pinter
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
151. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
152. See Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1994).
153. Although purchasers of private securities have the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 section
10(b) and Rule lob-5 available (which prohibit fraudulent conduct in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security), these remedies impose more demanding requirements in order to assert a prevailing
cause of action. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (comparing section 12(2) with section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5).
154. See Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1066, 1067.
155. See id. at 1067.
156. Id.
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registered, under section 5 of the Securities Act,"s or transactions exempt from
registration in accordance with section 3 of the Securities Act.'
"[T]he [Gustafson Court's] decision to pursue its policy preferences comes at
the price of disrupting the process of statutory interpretation."'59 The Court used
Gustafson as an opportunity to reduce the amount of securities litigation. The
Court twisted the language and structure of the Securities Act to reach its result-
oriented decision. The analysis used in Gustafson established precedent for the
securities bar, at the expense of over sixty years of sound case law. As a result
of Gustafson, the securities bar is presented with additional issues that will have
to be resolved by the courts."6°
A. Definition of a "Public Offering"
Although Gustafson limited the scope of section 12(2) to public offerings, it
neglected to elaborate on the concept of a "public offering." 4bsent any evidence
to the contrary, the Supreme Court's test set forth in SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co."' must control for the time being. In Ralston Purina, the Court enunciated
a standard that focused on whether all The offerees were sophisticated and had
access to the information that would otherwise be required in a registration
statement." Thi;, however, may not be the standard the Court had in mind
157. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1994).
158. Id. § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 77c.
159. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1079 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160. The ensuing cases have consistently followed the Gustafson holding. See Whirlpool Financial
Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605,609 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to private
placements); Fisk v. Superannuities, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 718,729-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Johnson v. Mutual
Say. Bank, No. 95 C 2379, 1996 WL 79414 (E.D. I11. Feb. 21, 1996) (dismissing a portion of the
plaintiffs § 12(2) caue of action for failing to allege the purchase of shares in a public offering); In re
Numerex Corp. See. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 391, 396 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that § 12(2) does not apply
in secondary trading o- private offerings); Gannon v. Continental Ins. Co., 920 F. Supp 566, 575 (D.N.J.
1996) (holding that since there was no allegation that any of the purchases were pursuant to a public
offering, the cause of r ction under § 12(2) should be dismissed); Baxter, v. A.R. Baron & Co., Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,923 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable since secondary market
trading was at issue); Glamorgan Coal Corp. v. Ratner's Group PLC, No. 93 Civ. 7881 (S.D.N.Y. July
7, 1995); In re U.S.A. Classic Sec. Litig., No. 93 Civ. 6667, 1995 WL 363841, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 19,
1995) (denying defendants motion to dismiss because plaintiffs complaint alleged the purchase of stock
pursuant to a prospectus in a public offering); ESI Montgomery County, Inc. v. Montenay Int'l Corp.,
899 F. Supp. 1061, 1064-65, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that Gustafson left
some room for § 12(2) to apply to private transactions, depending on the type of securities offered); De
La Rue v. United States Bankr. Corp., No. 94 Civ. 7925 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1995); In re Valance Tech.
Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 98,793 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 1995); Pollack v. Laidlaw Holdings,
Inc., No. 90 Civ. 5788. 1995 WL 261518, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 1995); Komanoff v. Mabon, Nugent
& Co., 884 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to secondary market
transactions); Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Endo v. Albertine, No. 88 Civ.
1815, 1995 WL 170030, at *3 (N.D. II1. Apr. 7, 1995) (holding § 12(2) inapplicable to private
placements).
161. 346 U.S. 119 (1935). The Ralston Purina Court defined the scope of the section 4(2)
exemption that exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering" from the registration
requirements of sectioi 5. See id. at 120.
162. See id. at 125-26. The Court chose not to focus on the quantity of offerees involved in the
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when it rendered Gustafson. The question of whether a transaction qualifies as
a public offering has additional significance now that section 12(2) has been
restricted thereto." It seems inevitable that the courts will be forced to decide
whether the Ralston Purina test will still apply in light of the Court's decision in
Gustafson.
B. Exempt Transactions
1. Transaction Exemptions Under Section 4(2)
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts any transaction by an issuer not




Furthermore, Regulation D, Rule 506 exempts from registration offers and sales
of securities within the meaning of section 4(2)."6 ,Section 4(2), by its very
definition ("not involving a public offering"), precludes the application of section
12(2) to any offerings within its ambit." However, the issue may become more
ambiguous if the judiciary adopts a more stringent interpretation of a "public
offering."
The application of section 12(2) to exempt offerings under Regulation D, Rule
506 is even more uncertain. Regulation D offerings "are not exempt from the
antifraud, civil liability . . . provisions of the federal securities laws." 67
Although this would appear to provide an offering exempt from the registration
requirements under Rule 506 with the protection of section 12(2), if the
transaction would not fall within Gustafson's scope of section 12(2), the
transaction will not be afforded the protections of section 12(2). Since Rule 506
is premised on section 4(2) and the fact that the transaction cannot involve a
public offering, it would be logical to conclude that transactions under Rule 506
are not within Gustafson's scope of section 12(2). This, however, is one more
issue for the judiciary to decide in the future.
offering, but instead looked at the sophistication, or quality, of the offerees. See id. at 123 ("[o be
public, an offer need not be open to the whole world.").
163. See, e.g., Fisk v. Superannuities, Inc., 927 F. Supp 718, 729-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Fisk, the
court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss a section 12(2) cause of action even though the plaintiffs
purchase was made pursuant to a private placement memorandum which stated that it "constitute[d] an
offer only to the person to whom [it was] delivered and only if such person is an accredited investor as
such term is defined in Rule 501(a) of Regulation D .. . ." Id. at 730. In addition, the subscription
agreement contained in the private placement memorandum required the prospective purchaser to
represent that he or she was an accredited investor for purposes of obtaining a registration exemption
under section 4(2). See id.
164. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
165. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1995).
166. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of "public offering");
see also S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
167. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1995) (Preliminary Note 1).
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2. Transaction Exemptions Under Section 3(b)
Gustafson held that "a document is not a prospectus ... if, absent an exemption
[section 3], it need not comply with § 10's requirements in the first place."'" This
seems to indicate that "if a transaction is exempt from registration and prospectus
delivery requirements only because of any of the exemptions of § 3 (other than
3(a)(2)), it will be treated under § 12(2) as if a prospectus were required and
§ 12(2) therefore will apply if its terms are met.""
There are various express exemptions under section 3(a) of the Securities Act.'
In addition, the Securities & Exchange Commission is authorized, pursuant to
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, to exempt any class of securities from registration
if it determines, that registration is not necessary in the public interest and for the
protection of investors based on the small amount involved or the limited character
of the public offering.' The Commission has utilized its authority under section
3(b) by promulgating, among other provisions, Regulation A" and Regulation
D.173
The Gustafson decision appears to hold section 12(2) applicable to transactions
exempt under section 3 of the Securities Act.74 This, however, conflicts with the
theory behind the Court's decision to limit the scope of section 12(2) liability to
public offerings. The transactions exempted under section 3 are excluded from the
registration requirements because they are already subject to other governmental
regulation or adequate information is already available to potential investors 75
168. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1067 (1995).
169. Ted J. Fiflis, Significant Securities Law Decisions of the Past Year as of June 14, 1995, A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study (July 27, 1995), available in Westlaw, CA36 ALI-ABA *51, *68.
170. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1994).
171. See id § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b). The maximum aggregate amount of the offering is limited
to $5 million. See id.
172. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1995). Regulation A allows an issuer to sell securities in an
unregistered offering if certain requirements are satisfied. These requirements consist of: the issuer must
be a United States or Canadian entity; the amount of the offering cannot exceed $1.5 million in a twelve-
month period; an Offering Statement (Form l-A) must be filed in the Commission's regional office; and
an offering circular, containing information with regard to the issuer and the securities, must be filed with
the Commission's regional office. See id.
173. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.505, .507-.508 (1995). Regulation D provides two exemptions from
registration under section 3(b): Rule 504 and Rule 505.
Rule 504 provides an exemption from registration for certain sales that do not exceed $1 million in
the previous twelve months. In arriving at the $1 million limitation, all transaction exemptions under
section 3(b) and all transactions in violation of section 5(a) are included in the aggregate amount. Rule
504 does not require information disclosure and is available to all issuers except investment companies
and reporting companie under the Exchange Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1995).
Rule 505 provides an exemption from registration for certain sales that do not exceed $5 million in
the previous twelve months and which have no more than 35 unaccredited purchasers. In arriving at the
$5 million limitation, all transaction exemptions under section 3(b) and all transactions in violation of
section 5(a) are included in the aggregate amount. Rule 505 is available to all issuers except investment
companies. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1995).
174. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
175. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS Er AL., SECURmES REGULATION 317-21 (7th ed. 1992).
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This would appear to be outside the scope of a public offering under Gustafson,
especially in light of the Court's recent trend in severely restricting the federal
securities law liability provisions. 76 This is one more issue that will create
additional, unwarranted controversy as a result of the Court's flawed analysis in
Gustafson.
3. Rule 144 and Rule 144A
Section 4(1) of the Securities Act exempts from registration a transaction "by any
person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer."'" Section 2(11) of the
Securities Act defines the term "underwriter" as "any person who has purchased
from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the
distribution of any security .... ." A person will be deemed a statutory
underwriter if he purchases shares from the issuer with a view to a distribution, and
the section 4(1) exemption will therefore not be available for the public resale by
such affiliate.'"
Rule 144, however, provides affiliates with the opportunity to publicly sell their
shares without registration if certain requirements are met." If the sale by the
affiliate meets the requirements of Rule 144, the affiliate is deemed not to be an
underwriter since the transaction does not involve a distribution." ' It would
therefore appear that section 12(2) would not apply to a sale protected by Rule 144,
since the sale presumably does not involve a public distribution, but instead involves
secondary market trading. The judiciary, however, could take exception to this
presumption and hold otherwise.
Rule 144A provides affiliates with the opportunity to publicly sell their shares to
"qualified institutional buyers" without registration if certain requirements are
met." The application of section 12(2) to resales under Rule 144A is more
ambiguous than Rule 144. Rule 144A states that it applies "solely to the application
of section 5 of the Act and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal
176. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
177. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (1994).
178. Id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77(1 1). The term "distribution" has been held to comprise "the entire
process by which in the course of a public offering the block of securities is dispersed and ultimately
comes to rest in the hands of the investing public." Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589, 597 (1946) (quoting
Oklahoma-Texas Trust, 2 S.E.C. 764, 769 (1937), affd, 100 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1939)).
179. See S.E.C. v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1960); S.E.C. v. Chinese Consol.
Benevolent Ass'n, 120 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1941); Ira Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946).
180. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1995). An affiliate may resell the securities after a three year holding
period without restriction; and engage in restricted resales after a two year holding period if (1) the issuer
is subject to Exchange Act reporting requirements for at least 90 days, or other information concerning
the issuer is available to the public; (2) the seller restricts the quantity of such resale during any quarter
to the greatest of: 1% of the outstanding securities; the average weekly volume of trading in the securities
based on reported trading on the national exchanges during a four week period preceding a notice
requirement; or the average weekly volume of trading in the securities reported through the consolidated
transaction reporting system; (3) the securities are sold in unsolicited brokers' transactions under section
4(4); and (4) a notice is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See id.
181. See id. § 230.144(b).
182. See id. § 230.144A.
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securities laws.""'3 However, if the requirements of Rule 144A are satisfied, the
presumption is that the person is not engaged in a distribution of securities.'"
Although the judiciary will likely hold that section 12(2) is unavailable to resales
qualifying under Rule 144A, it has yet to be decided after Gustafson.
C. Section 4(3) Prospectus Delivery Requirements for Dealers
The prospectus delivery requirements of section 5 vary depending on the
classification of the party involved in a particular transaction. Absent an exemption,
section 5 of the Securities Act prohibits the offer or sale of a security prior to the
filing of a registration statement.'s Once a registration statement has been filed,
absent an exemption, section 5(b) of the Securities Act imposes a prospectus
delivery requirement for all offers and sales of a security." An issuer of securities
must adhere to the prospectus delivery requirements as long as the issuer is offering
the securities to the public." An underwriter must obey the prospectus delivery
requirements as long as it is engaged in a "distribution.""'
The prospectus delivery requirements of section 5 also extend to dealers,
regardless of whether they are engaged as participants in the initial distribution."
Section 4(3)(C) mandates that dealers participating in a distribution must comply
with the prospectus delivery requirements of section 5(b) until they have sold their
entire allotment or subscription of the distribution."9 However, under section
'4(3)(B), all dealers, regardless of whether they are participating in a distribution,
must adhere to the prospectus delivery requirements of section 5(b) for either a forty
or ninety day time period. 9'
183. Id. § 230.144A preliminary note 1.
184. See id. § 230.144A(b).
185. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994).
186. Id. § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (1994). All such prospectuses must conform to the requirements
of section 10 of the Securities Act. Id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1994).
187. Id. § 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994).
188. Id § 4(3)(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(c) (1994).
189. "The term 'dealer' means any person who engages either for all or part of his time, directly or
indirectly, as agent, broker, or principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
or trading in securities issued by another person." Securities Act of 1933 § 2(12), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(12)
(1994).
190. See id. § 4(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(C).
191. See id. § 4(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3). If the distribution is an initial public offering, the
prospectus delivery period for dealers is 90 days after the later of (1) the effective date or (2) the date
the first bona fide offer for the security is made. If the issuer has previously sold its securities pursuant
to an effective registration statement, the dealer's requisite time period for prospectus delivery is reduced
to 40 days. See id.
However, the Securities & Exchange Commission, pursuant to its authority under section 4(3), enacted
Rule 174, which was created to reduce or eliminate the statutory period. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.174 (1995).
Rule 174 eliminates the prospectus delivery requirements for a dealer that is not participating in the
distribution in transactions involving (a) securities registered on Form F-6 or (b) an issuer subject to the
reporting requirements of f:ection 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. See id. § 230.174(a), (b). Rule 174
also abbreviates the prospectus delivery period for dealers in transactions by issuers that were not
reporting companies before the registration statement was filed. See id. § 230.174(d). In this situation,
the statutory period is reduced to 25 days provided that the securities are listed on a national exchange
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Section 4(3) is a perfect example of a traditional unambiguous provision that has
been transformed into a provision with additional significance as a result of the
Gustafson decision. The courts, in another classic display of judicial activism, have
interpreted section 4(3) (rather incorrectly) as extending the period of a public
offering."n Although the statute and its legislative history are devoid of any
mention of extending the time period of a public offering, 93 the courts have
provided a defective foundation for this reasoning." The significance of this
reasoning is substantially magnified when section 12(2) is brought into the picture.
Since section 12(2) only applies to the sale of securities in a public offering as
a result of Gustafson, the extension of the public offering time period to include the
relevant section 4(3) interval broadens the scope of potential liability under section
12(2). For example, suppose Mr. X purchases 100 shares of ABC Corp. (a
nonreporting company under the Securities Exchange Act and not listed on
NASDAQ) in a public offering. Fifteen days after the effective date of the public
offering registration, Mr. X sells the ABC securities to Laryl Mynch & Co., a dealer
that did not participate in the original distribution. Twenty days after the effective
date of the public offering registration, Laryl Mynch & Co. sells fifty shares of the
ABC securities to Mr. Y and encloses a prospectus with the delivery of the
securities in compliance with section 4(3)03). Mr. Y discards the prospectus without
ever reviewing it. One day after the prospectus delivery requirements for section
4(3) expire, Laryl Mynch & Co. sells fifty shares of the ABC securities to Mr. Z
and encloses a prospectus. The value of ABC Corp. then decreases dramatically.
Mr. Y and Mr. Z bring separate lawsuits against ABC Corp. for recision under
section 12(2) based on an untrue statement of material fact contained in the
materials which were delivered to them upon receipt of the securities. ABC Corp.
moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state
a cause of action. The appropriate outcome should be the court's dismissal of both
lawsuits for failure to state a cause of action because both Mr. Y and Mr. Z
purchased their shares in the secondary trading market. However, the recent court
decisions have dictated a different result in favor of Mr. Y. 95 Since Mr. Y
purchased his shares during the section 4(3)(C) period, Mr. Y can rescind his
purchase of the ABC securities, even though Mr. Y purchased the securities in the
secondary market.
The extension of the public offering time period to include the associated section
4(3) time frame results in an anomalous result in light of the Gustafson decision.
or are authorized for participation in an interdealer quotation system governed by a registered securities
association. See id. In addition, Rule 174 restricts the statutory period.in shelf registration offerings to
90 days after the first offering of securities. See id. § 230.174(c).
192. See, e.g., Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995); In re Proxima Corp. Sec.
Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,236 (S.D. Cal. 1994); Wade v. Industrial Funding Corp., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 98,144 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
193. For a legislative history of section 4(3), see H.R. REP. No. 83-1547 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2973.
194. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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Purchasers of securities in the secondary market may be afforded a recisionary
remedy if the secu.-ities were acquired within the prospectus delivery time frame
required by section 4(3). Securities that are acquired through the secondary market
are rarely acquired as a result of the selling efforts contained in a prospectus. In
fact, a substantial majority of the purchasers in the secondary market never actually
receive a prospectus because it is only required in certain situations,'" and in the
event that a purchaser receives a prospectus, more often than not, the security has
already been acquired." Therefore, even if the purchaser does not review or rely
on the requisite statutory prospectus, he or she may be able to invoke the
protections of section 12(2) and rescind the transaction, even though it occurred in
the secondary market, a transaction to which section 12(2) does not apply as a result
of the Supreme Court's decision in Gustafson.
D. Regulation S Offerings
Regulation S provides a registration exemption from section 5 of the Securities
Act." ' The General Statement to Regulation S provides that the registration
requirement of section 5 will not apply to the transaction if both the offers and sales
of the security occur outside the United States."' There are two applicable safe
harbors to Regulation S.' Rule 903 provides a safe harbor for offers and sales
by issuers, distributors, and their affiliates." Rule 904 provides a second safe
harbor for secondary, resale transactions by persons other than issuers and
distributors.' Any offer, sale, or resale that satisfies the requirements of either
safe harbor is considered to be outside the United States for purposes of the General
Statement, and the transaction, therefore, will not be subject to the registration
requirements of section 5.
Although Regulation S provides an exemption from the registration requirements,
it does not provide an exemption from the antifraud provisions of the federal
securities laws.a Even though the antifraud provisions apply to Regulation S
196. See supra 187-91 and accompanying text.
197. See Milton H. Cohen, 'Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1350-51 (1966)
("[W]hile the prospectu,; must be the first written communication . . . in connection with a public
offering, the law does not require that it be delivered before orders for the registered security may be
solicited, received, or even accepted, but only that its delivery precede or accompany delivery of the
security to the customer 'after sale.' Even if the customer is not legally committed to his purchase at (or
before) the moment of delivery of the security to him, he is surely 'committed' in the sense of having
made his investment decision well before this moment; yet this may be (and usually is) his first
opportunity to see the prospectus. At this point he can hardly be said to have derived benefit from the
affirmative aspect of the prospectus delivery requirements ... ." (footnotes omitted)).
198. See Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1995).
199. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 (1995).
200. For a comprehensive discussion on Regulation S and its safe harbors, see Guy P. Lander,
Regulation S - Securities Offerings Outside the United States, 21 N.C. J. INTL & COM. REG. 339
(1996).
201. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (1995).
202. See id. § 230.904.
203. "[Regulation S) relate[s] solely to the application of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 ...
and not to antifraud or other provisions of the federal securities laws." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-.904 (1995)
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offerings, the issue of whether section 12(2) is applicable to such offerings is
unresolved. A valid argument can be asserted that section 12(2) is inapplicable to
securities issued under a Regulation S exemption. Gustafson held, albeit incorrectly,
that in order to be classified as a "prospectus" for purposes of section 12(2), the
communication at issue must contain all of the required information under section
10 of the Securities Act.' Since Regulation S does not require a prospectus to
be delivered to the prospective investor, because it is by its nature exempt from the
registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities Act, the offering will
probably not involve a prospectus containing the information required by section 10
of the Securities Act. If a Regulation S offering does not involve a section 10
prospectus, it is logical to conclude that section 12(2) liability will not attach to the
information communicated to the investor in connection with the offering.
At least one post-Gustafson court has rejected this argument. In Sloane Overseas
Fund, Ltd. v. Sapiens International Corp., 5 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that an investor could rescind the purchase
of securities issued under a Regulation S offering.' The defendant in Sloane
offered the securities pursuant to an Offering Circular.' The plaintiffs com-
menced an action against the defendants for misrepresentations and omissions
contained in the offering circular under various provisions of the federal securities
laws, including section 12(2)."' The court stated that "an offering issued pursuant
to Regulation S is subject to liability under § 12(2) if it is a public offering. '
However, the mere fact that the offering is public does not compel the attachment
of section 12(2) liability to the communications associated with the offering. The
communication in question must conform to the requirements of section 10 to
qualify as a "prospectus" in order to invoke the protections of section 12(2). The
court reasoned, rather incorrectly, that since the Regulation S offering at hand
involved a "wide distribution of the Offering Circular [that] made [the defendants']
offering public," section 12(2) was applicable to the transaction; thus, the court
denied the defendants motion to dismiss the section 12(2) cause of action.210
E. Free Writing
After the registration statement becomes effective, selling literature is allowed to
be sent to prospective purchasers, as long as this communication has been preceded
or accompanied by a section 10(a) statutory prospectus.2 " This is commonly
(Preliminary Note 1).
204. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
205. 941 F. Supp. 1369 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
206. See id. at 1376-77.
207. See id. at 1372.
208. See id.
209. Id. at 1376.
210. Id. at 1376-77.
211. Section 2(10) of the Securities Act states:
The term "prospectus" means any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or
communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or
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known as "free writing." The Court in Gustafson stated that "a prospectus ... is
confined to a document that, absent an overriding exemption, must include 'the
information contained in the registration statement.""'2 2 It would therefore appear
that a material misrepresentation contained in a "free writing" communication is not
actionable under section 12(2) as a result of Gustafson."3 However, the Gustafson
Court also stated that "a prospectus under section 10 is confined to documents
related to public offerings."'2 4 The selling literature that is distributed to potential
purchasers under the "free writing" privilege would seem to qualify as a document
relating to a public offering and therefore fall within the ambit of section 12(2).
This apparent conflict will most likely be resolved by the judiciary in the future.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's misguided statutory interpretation in Gustafson is one more
example of the judiciary usurping the power of the legislature at the expense of
securities law practitioners. The driving force behind this policy-oriented decision
was an apparent attempt to curb future litigation under the federal securities laws.
However, the Court's flawed analysis has created several unanswered questions that
will have to be resolved by the judiciary before this objective can be accomplished.
Although this may be deemed a noble effort by the Court, the confusion and
ambiguity created by the decision could have been avoided if the Court had allowed
Congress to amend section 12(2)."5
confirms the sale of any security; except that (a) a communication sent or given after the
effective date of the registration statement ... shall not be deemed a prospectus if it is
proved that prior to or at the same time with such communication a written prospectus
meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of section 77j of this title [(Securities Act of
1933 § 10)] at the time of [sic] such communication was sent or given to the person to
whom the communication was made ....
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1994).
212. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1067 (1995).
213. This would create an anomalous scenario.
A seller can be hell liable for making a materially misleading oral statement relating to
a public offering exen though a statutory prospectus has been sent or given to the person
to whom the sellerpeaks. But if the seller makes an identical misstatement in a document
qualifying as free writing, no liability will result.
Elliott J. Weiss, Securities Act Section 12(2) After Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.: What Questions Remain?,
50 Bus. LAW. 1209, 1226 (1995).
214. Gustafson, 115 S. Ct. at 1067.
215. Some practitioners may argue that Congress' inaction would indicate their desire to leave the
issue alone or allow the judiciary to decide the issue. However, the 1994 congressional election resulted
in the Republican Party regaining control of Congress. This has already resulted in greater restrictions
on private rights of action under the federal securities laws. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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